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They know not what they do? Bolshevik Understandings of the Agency of 
Perpetrators, 1918-1930 
James Ryan 
 
‘A whole superstructure of different and specifically formed feelings, illusions, modes of thought 
and views of life arises on the basis of the different forms of property, of the social conditions of 
existence […] The single individual, who derives them through tradition and upbringing, may 
well imagine that they form the real determinants and the starting-point of his activity.’1 
Karl Marx, 1852 
 
This article examines how the Bolshevik party and state officials in early Soviet Russia understood 
the agency of their enemies, an important question to ask in order to illuminate the particular 
dynamics and complexities of state violence in the Soviet context. The focus here is on criminal 
justice, and on the relationship between the state and peasantry. The article traces the evolution 
of Bolshevik thought on these issues from the revolution until the onset of Stalinism, providing 
important intellectual context for the violent campaigns of the 1930s. The discussion exposes 
theoretical ambiguities, ironies and inconsistencies that characterize the intellectual history of the 
Soviet state’s violent and punitive practices. 
This article examines how perpetrators were represented in Bolshevik thought over the course of 
the first decade of Soviet power. It considers the implications of this for understanding the 
relationship between the state and various categories of the population, and the attendant violence 
of the state, in early Soviet Russia. The ‘perpetrator’ in question is not that primarily discussed in 
a recent edition of Slavic Review - the perpetrator of state violence - but rather the counter-
revolutionary or the criminal designated as such by the Bolshevik party-state.2 In that important 
discussion in Slavic Review, Lynne Viola explains the especially indeterminate and under-studied 
‘gray areas’ of distinguishing victims and perpetrators of violence in the Stalinist Soviet Union, 
but she also mentions the fluidity of the category of the enemy (or perpetrator) as identified by the 
state. One of the questions that she poses in this regard – ‘Could one transcend the past?’ – is to a 
large degree our conceptual concern in this article.3 Posed generally, this question was located at 
the core of the Soviet project. The teleological goal of attaining Communism required a new type 
of society, populated by ‘new people’ who had overcome the psychological, biological and 
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habitual inheritances of the past. Posed more specifically, this question was of immediate, practical 
concern for a state that found itself confronted by counter-revolutionary opposition and a general 
problem with law and order.  
The principal questions addressed here will concern the perceived agency of perpetrators (although 
these issues were not discussed explicitly by Bolsheviks in terms of ‘agency’). To what extent 
were those involved in alleged counter-revolution (or actions considered to have such 
consequences) or criminality perceived by the state to be consciously responsible for, or aware of 
the consequences of, their actions? To what extent were their actions the products of deception 
instigated by others, or the impact of material deprivation? Following logically from those 
questions, to what extent could perpetrators be reformed and integrated into Soviet society? How 
did the answers to those questions inform the theoretical and practical approaches of the state 
towards such individuals or groups? More basically, did questions of agency really matter at all? 
These questions relate to evolving understandings of human nature in Soviet Russia/the Soviet 
Union. Raymond Bauer, in his study of Soviet psychology published nearly sixty years ago, 
observed that ‘When one can describe the basic conception of human nature which is held in a 
given society he [sic] has come a long way toward understanding the nature of that society.’4 
The question of the agency of perpetrators is indeed important for understanding the theory and 
practice - and their dialectics - of Soviet state repression and violence. However, the intention here 
is not to privilege this question as a means of understanding Soviet state violence. Rather, a specific 
focus on how the ruling party and state officials ascribed agency to perceived enemies – and indeed 
how they often overlooked the agency of individuals to focus instead on membership of a suspect 
collective category – will afford insights into the particular dynamics, irregularities and 
complexities of state violence in the Soviet context. In theory, Leninism rejected notions of a type 
of ‘biological-racial paradigm’ with which to filter a population, adopting instead a ‘sociological 
paradigm’ that focused on individuals within the framework of their social circumstances, and 
their past/present political and social disposition.5 This allowed for a Bolshevik ‘hermeneutics of 
the [individual] soul.’6 Hence, the question of potentially life-and-death importance before a Soviet 
courtroom or police commission was not simply one’s class or national belonging, but primarily 
one’s past behaviour and present disposition. In theory, Soviet punitive policy (and the Gulag 
system in particular) was justified and even celebrated for its attempts to ‘reforge’ and ‘re-educate’ 
deviants, and to transform ‘nature,’ both environmental and human.7 In reality, however, there 
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existed considerable ambiguity within Leninism around the question of categorical belonging and 
the agentic autonomy of individuals, especially as discriminatory class differentiation and class 
struggle were integral components of the ideology.  
Much scholarship on Soviet state violence over the last fifteen years or so, and especially that 
focused on Soviet minority ethnicities, has demonstrated that at times violent practices appeared 
to be the results of something akin to an immutable-biological and even racialized approach to 
categorizing suspect population categories.8 This was the case especially after the Second World 
War, but it also applied clearly from the mid-1930s as state efforts to purify society intensified in 
accordance with the social upheavals brought about by Stalinist policies, the increasingly 
threatening international climate, and the dictates of an eschatological revolutionary time-frame. 
In addition, one of the ‘basic units’ of Stalinist-era violence, as Golfo Alexopoulos has argued 
compellingly, was an approach based on the collective punishment of the families and kin of those 
considered ‘enemies of the people’ or ‘enemy nations.’ Yet the children, especially, who were 
targeted by such violent practices were typically considered capable, eventually, of renouncing 
their kinship connections and asserting loyalty to the Soviet collective.9 The persistent tension 
between nature and nurture, as we will see, is a central aspect of Bolshevik representations of 
agency. 
What, then, do we mean by human ‘agency’? This term is commonly understood to signify 
purposiveness, intentionality, consciousness/awareness, and free will, and it relates to a sense of 
self-hood.10 Free will, or agency, is however exercised within social contexts and constraints. 
There is also a temporal dimension to agency, relating to how individuals (and collectives) relate 
themselves to the past and to the possibilities of the future.11 Marx provided a strikingly haunting 
image of this when he wrote that ‘The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare 
on the brains of the living.’12 Human agency, then, may be understood in a sociological sense as: 
the temporally constructed engagement by actors of different structural environments – the 
temporal-relational contexts of action – which, through the interplay of habit, imagination, 
and judgment, both reproduce and transform those structures in interactive response to the 
problems posed by changing historical situations.13 
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The particular Marxian conception of the inseparability of agency and structures (social, temporal) 
is well-known, and is illustrated clearly in the epigraph. The individual’s thought processes are 
derived ultimately from the material basis of society in the form of property ownership, and 
consequent social relations. What is most interesting in Marx’s outline of agency, for present 
purposes, is its complex, multi-layered nature of consciousness or awareness. That is, even when 
individuals consider themselves attuned to the psychological determinants and motives of their 
actions, Marx asserted that unless they understood the class structure of society and the relationship 
between base and superstructure, they would be operating, to some extent, under illusion. In the 
well-known formulation of Engels’s, they would possess ‘false consciousness.’14 In the Marxist-
Leninist understanding of the perennial question of the relationship between free will and 
determinism, the weight would appear to be on the side of determinism. Yet it must be borne in 
mind that in its revolutionary, missionary-like emancipatory purpose, there was necessarily plenty 
of scope therein for the autonomy of the self.15 
This article will examine the Bolshevik approach to the agency of perpetrators by focusing on two 
issues that allow examination of this question particularly well and in some detail: criminal justice, 
and conceptions of peasant disorder. The regime did not exactly relate to criminals and peasants 
in similar ways; much of the peasantry, after all, was supposed to provide support for the 
proletarian revolution as natural allies of the workers. In Bolshevik thought, however, both 
categories were especially imprinted, unwittingly and in different ways, with the iniquities of the 
old regime; both posed distinct threats to the successful construction of a socialist society; and 
both were putatively stratified along lines of class and agency, with gender distinctions also 
important. Indeed, most of the deadly violence of the Soviet state in the 1930s were directed 
against peasants (and then ‘former kulaks’) and so-called ‘socially dangerous elements,’ including 
recidivist criminals, as well as suspect ethnicities. The article will provide important intellectual 
context for understanding such violent campaigns, but its purpose is to trace the evolution of 
Bolshevik thought on these issues before the onset of Stalinism per se. To continue this theme into 
the 1930s would require an additional paper. The article will demonstrate the often complex, multi-
layered and uncertain nature of Bolshevik conceptions of agency, strongly informed by ideology 
but also by more practical considerations. This question exposes theoretical ambiguities, ironies 
and inconsistencies that characterize the intellectual history of the Soviet state’s violent and 
punitive practices.16 Bolshevik ascriptions and representations of agency, or indeed lack thereof, 
could support either a lenient and reformatory or a repressive approach to the perpetrator, 
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depending on the particular circumstances and ideological dynamics at work. For the most part, 
Bolshevik understandings of these issues would help prevent the emergence of a truly ‘genocidal 
ideology’ (to use Amir Weiner’s expression) in the Soviet Union.17 Theoretical commitment to 
reform and to an understanding of individuals as individuals persisted, and the party was self-
consciously opposed to the ‘zoological,’ racialized thinking of the Nazis. However, practices of 
Soviet state repression and violence were often driven by more pragmatic security concerns that 
challenged or modified these theoretical implications, and the relevance of the questions of 
individual agency and malleability.18 Hence, examination of this question of agency facilitates 
understanding of the origins of campaigns of mass violence and social cleansing in the Soviet 
Union. 
Reform versus Repression 
The Bolshevik party took over a country in late 1917 suffering its fourth year of war and 
undergoing a social revolution, and it struggled to establish state order. In particular, the new 
power was confronted with crises in supplying food from the countryside to urban areas, and in 
ensuring an operational transport system.19 In addition, from the very outset of the revolution, the 
Bolsheviks faced armed opposition from their opponents of varying political hue, and by the 
summer of 1918 they were faced with full-scale frontal civil war. The intensification of the civil 
war, widespread peasant revolts, and fear of a full-scale assault on Soviet power from domestic 
opponents supported by hostile foreign powers resulted in a campaign of ‘Red Terror’ that was 
officially proclaimed in early September 1918. The Chekas (political police units) did not restrict 
themselves to shooting political opponents during the Terror, but continued to shoot recidivist 
criminals, as they had been doing for several months, and they also struck against peasants, priests, 
intellectuals and political activists.20 The Bolshevik leadership appeared to be calling for terror 
against the bourgeoisie as a class, although the party’s central newspaper, Pravda, clarified that 
‘It is necessary to account for all bourgeois gentlemen, as you did with the officers, and terminate 
all, dangerous for the affairs of the revolution.’21 Thus, from the outset of the revolution, 
Bolsheviks confronted the question of how they should understand the agency of their enemies, 
with its life-and-death implications. 
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There was a consensus that execution should be reserved for those ‘irreconcilable’ to the new 
order, but not on who constituted that category. Martin Latsis, a leading Cheka figure, infamously 
asserted that Chekists should not search for evidence of a suspect’s wrongdoing, but, rather, the 
‘essence of Red Terror’ was that a suspect’s fate should be determined by their class.22 Latsis’s 
comments prompted Lenin to stipulate that ‘red terror’ was required only for ‘the forcible 
suppression of exploiters who attempted to restore their rule.’23 Writing in Pravda during the 
Terror, Nikolai Osinskii, head of the Supreme Council of the National Economy, explained that 
the ‘destruction of the bourgeoisie as a class’ should not mean ‘the physical extermination of all 
the bourgeoisie.’ Reiterating the materialist Marxist understanding of social thought, he asserted 
that assault on the economic basis of the bourgeoisie would serve to ‘castrate’ that ‘breed of 
people.’24 However, there was a greater tendency within the Chekas to impute an essentially 
unreformable nature to class enemies, or at least little concern on Chekists’ part with attempting 
to reform them. In Voronezh province, Chekists resolved in mid-September that they would rather 
‘destroy the whole bourgeois class than give it victory.’25  
Indeed, there were significant differences in ideas between the Chekas and the Justice 
Commissariat (NKIu), the other institution of the Soviet state charged with dealing with 
undesirable elements.26 The Soviet conception of criminal justice was highly progressive in 
comparative European terms, based firmly on a positivist understanding of crime that placed 
responsibility substantially on social circumstances rather than the volition of the criminal, and 
hence penal policy was oriented toward the rehabilitation of offenders.27 Miacheslav Kozlovskii, 
one of the leading formulators of Soviet criminal justice, explained in the journal of NKIu in 1918 
that ‘Every crime is a product of irreconcilable class antagonisms,’ and not a person’s ‘free will.’28 
If crime was determined principally by forces external to the criminal, how then should the law 
deal with a criminal who was not, ultimately, responsible? Kozlovskii, who appeared to be setting 
forth the general view of NKIu, disagreed explicitly with the notion that crime would continue to 
result from ‘human instincts’ even under desirable social conditions. His apparent belief in the 
perfectibility of humankind was a function of the strongly nurturist approach of NKIu. However, 
Kozlovskii did not suggest that strongly punitive measures, even ‘terror,’ would have no place in 
Soviet law. Soviet penal policy, he reasoned, would not be based on ‘retribution’ but would seek, 
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rather, the ‘correction’ of the criminal; yet at the same time the state would need to defend society 
from criminal elements. In this sense, punishment was labeled in Soviet discourse ‘measures of 
social defence’ (‘meryi sotsial’noi zashchityi’), although in theory ‘social defence’ was equated 
with reform of the criminal.29  
 
The head of the Punitive Department of NKIu, L. Savrasov, explained that the intention of Soviet 
punitive policy was the ‘“treatment” of criminal elements.’ Each inmate would be diagnosed to 
determine what measures of treatment were required, and as such prisoners would not be separated 
according to the severity of their crimes but, rather, the requirement of their treatments.30 The 
inmate would undergo a medical examination to check for signs of physical and psychological 
‘degeneration,’ and would be separated into one of several various detention institutions.31 The 
purpose of ‘correction’ or ‘treatment’ was to ‘re-educate’ these ‘unwilling victims’ of the previous 
social order, ‘through change in their psychology and adaptability to the existing conditions of 
life.’32 The task of re-education would involve both labour and ‘cultural-educational work’ in the 
institutions.33 It would harmonise, thereby, with the central goal of the party to effect ‘cultural 
revolution,’ to raise the cultural and educational levels of Soviet citizens, in an attempt to raise the 
‘New Man’ of the future.34 
 
Soviet legal theorists, then, understood crime as the product of social circumstances, but they also 
recognized the role of individual agency, even if in a rather deterministic sense. Individuals reacted 
to circumstances in different ways according to psychological make-up, and social conditions 
could produce individuals with nasty inclinations.35 Soviet criminology until the late 1920s was 
theoretically sophisticated, informed by and at least on an intellectual par with Western 
scholarship.36 Daniel Beer, referring specifically to Soviet biomedical discourse of the 1920s, 
notes that the assumption that ‘only “environmental” explanations of crime could be 
accommodated within the frame of Marxist theory is not borne out by the criminal scholarship.’37 
The psychiatrist Alfred Shtess could write in the weekly journal of NKIu in 1922 that ‘Diagnosis 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
of the mental constitution of the criminal is a vitally important question in the discovery of the 
nature and genesis of crime.’38 Indeed the psychological determinants of crime would become 
more prominent in Soviet criminological discussions in the 1920s.39 The Soviet approach to 
criminology, based on a modernist ethos of scientific rationality and a civilizing mission, assumed 
that the causes of crime could be scientifically observed (through ‘bio-psychological’ clinical and 
socioeconomic analyses) and remedied. This was the guiding assumption of the Moscow Soviet’s 
Laboratory for the Study of the Criminal and Crime, established in 1923, and the State Institute 
for the Study of Crime and the Criminal, established two years later.40 In a book setting out the 
approach to its work, based on ‘scientific determinism,’ the Moscow Laboratory emphasised that 
‘we cannot, of course, look at a criminal as a bearer of a malicious free will.’ Rather, ‘every one 
of our [humanity’s] steps, every thought’ is the result of the complex interplay of the biological 
and the social.41 
For the medical experts who occupied prominent positions in Soviet criminology, mental affliction 
or psychopathology of some sort, derived from social conditions, were the real sources of crime.42 
The biomedical discourse of Soviet criminology even suggested that the degenerative 
psychological effects of a corrupting environment could become biologically encoded in the 
individual and hereditarily transmitted, thereby ensuring a greater disposition to crime.43 Evgenii 
Krasnushkin, one of the country’s foremost forensic psychiatrists, placed the Soviet approach to 
criminology within the broader context of criminologists’ rejections of Cesare Lombroso’s 
seminal study of 1876 that asserted the notion of the innate, atavistic criminal ‘species.’ There 
were no born criminals, Krasnushkin asserted, but nonetheless criminals (at least habitual 
criminals) were psychologically and physically defective. They displayed differences in ‘nature’ 
relative to ordinary people, the product, ultimately, of the environment that nourished and the 
diseases that afflicted them (syphilis, substance abuse, etc.). Krasnushkin believed that heredity 
was less significant in determining criminal behaviour than acquired disease.44 However, the 
ultimate effect of such biomedical discourse was to challenge belief in the ability of the state to 
reform criminals (and class enemies), and to allow for a focus on the ‘nature’ of criminals rather 
than simply the environment that nurtured them, even though they were considered unfortunate 
products of that environment. This reflected a more general conflict, as Sharon Kowalsky has 
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observed, between the Bolsheviks’ progressive vision of cultural transformation and the ‘persistent 
remnants of the past that the Bolsheviks attempted to destroy as they established new norms of 
proper “Soviet” behaviour.’45 
Indeed, through the biomedical discourse that characterized continuities across late imperial 
Russian and Soviet criminology, the dangers posed to society by criminal elements could 
theoretically justify extreme measures of ‘social defence.’46 Criminologists did not always 
acknowledge it in their writings, but, as Daniel Beer pithily summarizes, Soviet punitive policy 
makers ‘necessarily had to confront the problem of what to do with those individuals whose moral 
and mental faculties were so degraded [by corrupting environments or circumstances] that they 
posed a threat to the health of society.’47 Yet, even when the state rejected the possibility of 
reforming certain individuals or groups, this ‘did not amount to an endorsement of the finality of 
biological determinism;’ rather, it suggested acknowledgement that the effects of degeneracy 
could not be reversed during that individual’s lifetime, or that the necessary means were beyond 
the state’s current capacity. Hence, as Beer has demonstrated, an effectively biological 
understanding of crime could theoretically co-exist with a rejection of crude biological 
determinism.48 In fact, from as early as late 1918 Savrasov posed the question whether it would 
always be possible to ‘correct’ the criminal, and hence whether there should not be more sever 
punishments, referring to crimes of large-scale speculation, bribery, and very deliberate abuse of 
office. The notion that there is crime but not criminals, he suggested, had been taken to ‘absurd’ 
lengths in Soviet legal consciousness.49 Savrasov accepted that his views were somewhat 
‘heretical,’ as in Soviet penal theory ‘there are no incorrigible criminals.’ Nonetheless, he 
suggested that his ‘heretical’ viewpoint was more pragmatic than theoretical, reasoning that there 
was neither enough time nor resources to reform all criminals. In fact, paragraph 9 of the 
Governing principles of criminal law of the RSFSR, issued by NKIu in 1919, enshrined the 
principle of ‘physical extermination’ of incorrigible criminals in ‘exceptional cases.’50  
Following the civil war and adoption of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1921, the country was 
placed on a firmer legal footing. Crime rates, however, remained very high, with the effects of 
alcoholism often appearing as a contributing factor (once again reflecting the distance between 
Bolshevik ideals of cultural revolution and the realities of Soviet society).51 NEP allowed for a 
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limited restoration of capitalism, and for the party it was characterized by a general climate of 
anxiety and uncertainty resulting from a pervasive fear that the revolution would be endangered. 
Legal theorists and criminologists, as noted, were devoting more attention to the personalities of 
criminals in their articles, and it is clear that by the early 1920s opinion in NKIu had more or less 
come to postulate that not all criminals would be reformed. The editorial collegium of the NKIu 
journal, the Soviet Justice Weekly (Ezhenedel’nik Sovetskoi Iustitsii), drew attention to the possible 
agentic differences in question: Whether or not the crime was the result of ‘malicious will’ (‘zloi 
voli’), and whether or not perpetrators were aware of the consequences of their actions.52 Speaking 
at the All-Russia congress of penitentiary specialists in 1923, the deputy procurator of the Russian 
Republic, Ruben Katan’ian, distinguished three categories of criminal: Those ‘unstable’ elements 
who were easily influenced to turn to crime (and hence relatively easy to reform); those who could 
be ‘retained’ for proletarian society; and, finally, those ‘hopeless elements’ who could not prove 
useful for the new society.53 Most significantly Nikolai Krylenko, then deputy Commissar of 
Justice, declared at the same congress that ‘in present circumstances’ the principal purpose of 
criminal justice was the protection of society, not the protection or reform of individuals.54 The 
first Soviet Criminal Code, adopted in 1922, stated as its purpose the defense of the state from 
crime and from ‘socially-dangerous elements.’55 In fact, Article 49 of the Code allowed courts to 
deprive persons considered ‘socially-dangerous’ of the right to reside in certain areas, even if they 
had not committed any crime but had connections to a criminal environment. In 1924 the USSR 
Council of People’s Commissars (government) amended this to allow for deportation of such 
persons from the USSR, even if acquitted in court of the crime accused of.56  
Legal theorists and criminologists continued to debate the practicalities of reform of criminal 
elements, especially with regard to recidivism and class belonging. Peter Solomon has identified 
the ‘progressive’ strand of Soviet penal policy that predominated in the 1920s as based on leniency 
of sentence but also differentiation of category of prisoner, with harsher sentences for recidivists 
and class enemies, although he does not examine the discussions around this.57 One contributor to 
the Soviet Justice Weekly, in April 1922, accepted that rehabilitation was the ‘cornerstone’ of 
Soviet punitive policy, but rejected as ‘very mistaken’ the view that crime resulted ‘exclusively’ 
from unfortunate circumstances. Some criminals were ‘deliberate’ and ‘cunning,’ he explained, 
for whom punishment in the true sense should be reserved. Nonetheless, his qualification that 
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‘punishment’ should last ‘for the present transitional period’ suggested that he did not envisage 
this as final judgement.58 On the other hand, from as early as 1922, several articles in the Weekly 
raised concerns about the tendency of courts and the regular police to conceptualize a criminal 
contingent or a criminal ‘class,’ and to deal with such persons outside of regular judicial process.59 
Critics of such tendencies and practices viewed them as distortions of the concept of ‘social 
defense,’ and violations of individual rights. One article drew attention to a campaign announced 
by the central investigative agency of the regular police to round up thieves on the basis of previous 
convictions, which was successfully prevented by NKIu. In Moscow city and province in early 
1921, however, the police and courts had established a mechanism (which had ceased by 1922) 
that allowed courts to send suspicious persons to prison on the basis of a previous conviction, in 
the absence ‘at the present moment’ of any criminal activity.60  
Regarding recidivists, I. Slavin opined in the Weekly that only a small percentage of them could 
be considered ‘socially-dangerous,’ or significant threats to social order. Moreover, he argued that 
the socioeconomic determinants of crime in the early 1920s were even more serious than before, 
a result of hunger and unemployment.61 Other commentators suggested that an important reason 
for recidivism rested with the inadequacies of the Soviet penal system itself, namely the absence 
of sufficient (or even any) ‘cultural-educational work’ in prisons, and the social stigma faced by 
those who had served time once released.62 However, as Paul Hagenloh notes, while legal theorists 
continued to debate these issues, the political and regular police had in the course of the 1920s 
‘settled on an approach to “dangerous” criminal cohorts’ that ensured that such groups were often 
targets of extrajudicial police repression.63 
The other category of criminal that challenged Soviet legal theorists’ theoretical commitment to 
reform measures in the 1920s was the class enemy, the bourgeoisie. The nature-nurture tension in 
Bolshevik thought was most apparent in this regard. Just before the introduction of NEP Feliks 
Dzerzhinskii, the head of the political police and the Commissar of Internal Affairs (NKVD), 
lamented that Soviet prisons were ‘overflowing’ with workers and peasants, not class enemies. He 
sought ‘comradely leadership’ rather than prison for working elements suffering from ‘poor 
consciousness,’ but he sought intensified repression of bourgeoisie perpetrators that would involve 
the creation of concentration camps solely for bourgeois inmates.64 Aleksandr Beloborodov, 
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appointed Commissar of Internal Affairs in 1923, echoed his predecessor about the need for a 
‘strict class line’ in punitive policy. Beloborodov suggested that semi-literate or illiterate workers 
and peasants could not be considered conscious agents of crime. Such a view suggested the 
imposition of a particular conception of ‘backwardness’ or ‘primitiveness’ on the lower classes, 
something that also took gendered form through Soviet criminologists’ views of deviant women 
as especially prone to ‘primitiveness’ and irrational behavior due to their female physiology.65 
However, as regards ‘Nepmen’ (entrepreneurs), speculators, etc., Beloborodov asserted that they 
acted out of ‘malicious class will’ (‘zloi klassovoi voli’).66 There was, then, a clear theoretical 
inconsistency here between the general notion that criminality did not result from ‘free will,’ an 
idea that continued to be expounded in the 1920s, and the assertion that class enemies acted 
according to class will.67 By 1924 this idea of an intensified class approach formed part of what 
was known as the ‘new course’ in penal policy, which involved stronger repressive measures in 
the form of special isolated prisons for ‘class enemies’ and professional criminals (even if the latter 
were from the lower classes), and attempts to reduce prison overcrowding through reduced 
sentences and releases of workers and peasants who had committed petty crimes out of 
ignorance.68  
This ‘new course’ in punitive policy seemed to embed more deeply the notion that the class enemy 
would not be reformed. Shmuel Fainblit, of the legal department of the Workers’ and Peasant’s 
Inspection, mentioned in an article in late 1923 that the class enemy ‘we, you see, punish, but do 
not reform’ (‘karaem, a ne ispravliaem’).69 Such a notion, however, was belied by the fact that the 
maximum prison sentence allowed by the Criminal Code was ten years. Greater clarity was 
provided by the young Moscow University professor Andrei Piontkovskii in his extensive 1924 
book on the general outline of Soviet criminal law, published under the auspices of the Institute of 
Soviet Law. Piontkovskii wrote that ‘the bourgeoisie will always remain the bourgeoisie,’ and he 
explained that the ‘educative’ function of Soviet criminal justice would have no real effect on the 
psychological make-up of class enemies, although the state’s punitive policies would help to 
prevent them from infringing public order. However, and not without contradiction, he did suggest 
that ‘re-education of criminals from the bourgeoisie’ would eventually be possible, but only as a 
consequence of the ‘deformation’ of the bourgeoisie as a class that would occur in the process of 
socialist construction.70 That is, reform of criminals from the bourgeoisie was, according to 
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Piontkovskii, explicitly not considered the task of Soviet criminal justice; this would be an effect, 
rather, of the wider transformation of society under Soviet rule. Piontkovskii and leading figures 
in Soviet penitentiary affairs such as E. Shirvindt did, however, object to any crude rendering and 
‘distortion’ of the class principle. Soviet penal policy should serve the interests of the proletarian 
revolution, without crudely assessing offenders on the basis of their class origin.71 
Understanding Popular Opposition 
Soviet power was supposedly that of the workers and peasants, or more accurately, the dictatorship 
of the workers and poorest peasantry. However, apart from the White armies and their international 
backing during the civil war, the greatest challenges to Bolshevik rule until the Nazi invasion arose 
from popular, mainly peasant, discontent. In the Marxist-Leninist social hierarchy, industrial 
workers were the vanguard of the toiling narod, more aware of the nature of social realities, and 
entrusted to lead the peasants. Peasants occupied an ambivalent position as a consequence of their 
status as small-scale producers, stratified to varying degrees between the proletariat on the one 
hand and the bourgeoisie on the other. In terms of the psychological and cultural battle as 
conceived by the ruling party, peasants could be won over to support either the proletariat or 
bourgeois private enterprise. During the civil war the state confiscated all surplus peasant grain at 
fixed, largely worthless prices, and peasant resistance to the state’s demands met with violent class 
rhetoric as well as violent force. However, NEP allowed and indeed encouraged peasants to trade 
in grain in order to help restore economic growth, and perforce the regime had to tolerate the 
peasant as a rational economic agent. The ideological tensions that this relationship produced 
helped to shape the replacement of NEP with policies of forcible collectivization and de-
kulakization, which, as some scholars have stressed, constituted a ‘war on village culture’ in 
addition to the state’s assertion of complete control over the economy.72 
Throughout the period considered in this article, much popular discontent was explained (in public 
and private party and state discourse) through economic hardship, thereby presenting it as rational 
and an economic challenge for the state to meet. The party, however, was strongly inclined to see 
the nefarious influence of its enemies behind outbreaks of disorder, especially strikes and 
uprisings. Popular discontent, in such instances, could then be explained partly as a result of 
popular ‘ignorance’ or ‘darkness.’ Police reports (information svodki and summarized monthly 
obzoryi) sent to the party’s leaders during the 1920s explained workers’ strikes and discontent 
principally as results of non-payment of wages and other economic factors, although in the early 
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part of the decade the role of agitation by Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries (SRs) was 
often cited as crucially important as well.73 It was in the countryside, though, that the regime faced 
its greatest challenges. During the civil war – and afterwards, in some places – a veritable civil 
war existed behind the Red-White front lines with the extent of peasant uprisings and their 
suppression. The reasons for such rebellions included the state’s policy of forcible expropriation 
of grain and horses; the levy of an extraordinary tax and the way this was recovered; the heavy-
handedness of, and abuses committed by, requisitioning detachments and poor peasants’ 
committees established in the summer of 1918; and forcible conscription into the Red Army.74 
Bolsheviks did not deny these reasons, publicly or privately. To take one example, the government 
commission sent to investigate the suppression of an uprising in a district of Iaroslavl’ province 
described the rise of an ‘anti-soviet mood’ amongst the peasants that led to insurgency. This was 
attributed to material deprivation and opposition to conscription of both men and horses, as well 
as some ‘mistakes’ on the part of local officials. However, the report noted that ‘White agents’ had 
then managed to convert the insurgent deserter movement into an ‘extensive counter-revolutionary 
organization.’ The commission concluded that the local authorities had acted correctly when 
putting down the uprising, though the Cheka had probably executed some entirely innocent 
people.75  
For the police and the party, the rhetorical emphasis in explanations of peasant uprisings during 
the civil war – in external and internal language - was typically upon the role played by malicious 
anti-Bolshevik agitators.76 Many of the police reports presented a schema that undermined the 
authentic agency of the peasants, portraying them as a dark, unenlightened mass that could be 
turned one way or the other depending on who won the battle to reach them with agitation.77 In 
this regard, Bolsheviks demonstrated a shared understanding of the ‘dark,’ benighted peasants with 
the Russian intellectual, professional and political elite across the revolution’s divisions. Yanni 
Kotsonis has described this conception of ‘backwardness’ as an ideology in itself, providing an 
explanatory framework ‘to diagnose and lend meaning to facts’ such as peasant rebellions, and 
thereby strengthening the party’s resolve in its enlightening, civilizing mission.78 One article in a 
Red Army journal in 1919 described a commonly-heard peasant expression – to the effect of ‘for 
Soviet power but against the Communist Party’ – as ‘alien,’ ‘kulak’ words, but ‘not their own.’79 
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When they rose against Soviet power, the presence of ‘dark forces,’ usually Right SRs and kulaks 
(well-to-do, allegedly exploitative peasants), were often described as having made use of material 
difficulties to incite the unenlightened masses of ‘little consciousness/awareness’ 
(‘malosoznatel’nost’’) against Soviet power. The repression of such instigators, who were 
supposedly impeding the sacred march of the revolution, the police therefore suggested as 
absolutely necessary.80 The reports also demonstrate the belief, apparently shared throughout the 
party-state apparatus, in the ability of well-conducted party agitation to turn the tide of discontent 
or passivity towards Bolshevik rule; the message frequently communicated was that with the 
arrival of the party’s agitators, there was an almost immediate change of mood amongst the 
peasants.81  
The purpose of the reports, then, was to gauge popular moods, identify the regime’s opponents so 
that they could be dealt with, and allow for the shaping of popular attitudes.82 However, the reports 
did not follow a simple template, and there are many examples of somewhat alternative scenarios. 
In some cases the mood of the population of a locality as a whole was described as ‘counter-
revolutionary.’83 Some police reports and reports from other sources made no mention of the role 
of ‘counter-revolutionary’ agitation in generating discontent, or they described revolts of 
mobilized men that were ‘supported’ (rather than incited) by kulaks and White Guards.84 It is quite 
interesting that Soviet external language sometimes directly addressed the responsibility of 
ordinary peasants for these uprisings, despite the overriding sense in Bolshevik discourse that they 
were being misled. The front page of Pravda on 20 November 1918 began with a message for the 
‘working peasants’ that explained that uprisings were being led by kulaks and that peasants were 
easily deceived; nonetheless, the ‘deceived’ working peasants were committing ‘crimes against all 
the working people.’ The author displayed little sympathy, warning that Soviet power would 
punish severely any such criminal actions.85 Similarly, a columnist in a Tambov newspaper in 
April 1919 described how peasants were being led to ‘Cain-like actions’ against the interests of 
the workers and peasants, warning that, following suppression of the uprisings, it would be difficult 
to differentiate (for punishment) those who acted consciously from victims of provocation or 
forcible enlistment.86 Yet, the previous month the same columnist had accepted that the terrible 
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abuses being committed by state and party agents in the countryside were understandably doing 
more to incite peasants to revolt than counter-revolutionary agitation.87  
How, then, was the class enemy in the countryside identified and defined? By 1919 Bolsheviks 
accepted that the revolution and land reform had ‘levelled’ economic divisions within the 
peasantry to a considerable extent, with the vast majority now located in the category of ‘middle’ 
peasants. There was in any case a certain mythology around Bolshevik class categories; as Donald 
Raleigh explains, working-class identity had become, in some respects, ‘a social-psychological 
and political projection in which any act of opposition to Soviet power brought symbolic 
expulsion’ from its ranks.88 When police reports or the speeches of party leaders referred to ‘kulak 
revolts,’ it is not entirely clear whether this meant the ascription of insurgent peasants to the ranks 
of the class enemy, or merely that the leading role was assumed to be played by ‘kulaks.’89 In any 
case, a general Bolshevik suspicion of peasants was never very far from the surface. Evgenii 
Varga, a Hungarian academic at the Soviet Academy of Sciences and a party member, provided a 
strikingly blunt assessment. Writing in the early 1920s, he asserted that the majority of peasants 
would defend Soviet power against any restoration of the old order, but they were opposed to state 
interference in their economic affairs and were, in fact, ‘even hostile’ to socialism.90 
The adoption of NEP meant that the party had to tolerate the small-scale peasant economy for the 
foreseeable future, as well as the strengthening of and growth in the ranks of the ‘wealthy’ peasants 
and kulaks. Throughout the 1920s, concern was raised in the party about the growing stratification 
of the countryside, with many poor peasants having become dependent economically on the 
wealthier. More sober commentators, whose views were predominant in party discourse in the 
mid-1920s, consistently pointed out that kulaks constituted no more than 4% of rural households, 
which encouraged the belief that their threat was not very significant and would be relatively easy 
to manage.91 Indeed, from 1923 until 1926, Soviet agrarian policy was essentially pro-‘well-to-do’ 
peasants. This strategy rested on the optimistic view that the socialist state would be able to control 
capitalist tendencies and direct them along socialist lines, and at the same time ensure the cultural 
and political upbringing (vospitanie) of the people. Yet, as Sheila Fitzpatrick puts it, ‘Communists 
still instinctly regarded kulaks as the enemy.’92 Moreover, the cultural education of the peasantry 
– a crucial component of the projected success of NEP - failed to materialize as intended. 
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Illustrating this, an NKVD publication explained the majority of the high number of crimes 
committed in the countryside in the mid-1920s through the persistence of the ignorance, ‘savage 
morals’ and drunkenness associated with everyday rural life and customs.93 
For most of the 1920s, the influence of ‘kulaks’ in generating peasant discontent remained a feature 
of police reports. Kulaks were characterized therein not simply by their relative economic strength 
but also by a suggestion of deliberate class consciousness, indicating that they were separate from 
the general peasantry.94 Some reports described how kulaks ‘search for any means for the 
economic enslavement of the poor,’ and ‘mercilessly exploit’ them.95 For the most part, however, 
peasants in general were portrayed as rational economic agents, with discontent largely the result 
of state errors. Indeed, as recent studies of NEP have shown, until at least 1925 and probably 1926, 
there appeared to be a mutual willingness on the part of state and peasantry to work together on 
the basis of market relations. This relationship began to break down once the party-state turned its 
‘face to the village’ more intently from late 1924, in order to strengthen the relationship with the 
peasantry and to ‘revitalize’ rural soviets by making them more politically reliable.96 The party, 
concerned about what it viewed as a countryside still very much outside the reach of its civilizing 
mission, observed increasing peasant activism with a mixture of unease and encouragement, 
indicative of a perceived intensification of class struggle. It is in this regard that we can observe 
the outer limits of Bolshevik ideological discourse, the strength of the Bolshevik ideological mind-
set, and the improbability of a continuation of a meaningful compromise between state and 
peasantry into the 1930s. Once again the issue of peasant agency was critical, whether in terms of 
imputed lack of political awareness or malicious intent.  
The theoretical basis of NEP was a union between workers and peasants. Yet, in the second half 
of the 1920s the attention of the police and party was focused firmly on the increasing demands of 
rural inhabitants for equality with urban workers, whom the peasants believed received favours 
from the regime. In particular, there was widespread demand for the establishment of peasants’ 
unions (equivalent to trades unions) to defend peasant interests. Police reports consistently 
maintained that the intention behind the establishment of such unions - which in places was 
supported by local party and Komsomol (communist youth league) members - was 
overwhelmingly economic, with political and ‘anti-soviet’ motivations much fewer and even 
‘negligible.’97 What was unacceptable to the party leadership and police, however, was the fear 
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that such unions would become instruments by which the class enemy would undermine the 
proletarian dictatorship. Some police reports warned that this was precisely why wealthy peasants 
were agitating for them.98 This fear, based on the memory of peasant rebellions in previous years, 
was very strong. The head of the Siberian branch of the OGPU (political police) reported to 
Dzerzhinskii in June 1925 that a continued improvement in the economic position of the peasantry 
would lead to ‘an appetite for power,’ and would create a favourable situation for domestic and 
foreign counter-revolutionaries who would intensify agitation for peasant unions. Counter-
revolutionary groups, he reminded Dzerzhinskii, were calculating primarily on the peasants.99 It is 
instructive to consider the speech given by Lev Kamenev at a plenum of the Moscow soviet in 
March 1925, in which he returned to the notion of peasants speaking in an alien voice. There was 
‘no more serious political task,’ he stated, than ‘to study the mood of the peasantry.’ Yet when 
peasants declared that ‘the workers work little, but live better than the peasants,’ or when they 
sought to ‘oppose’ workers’ unions with peasants’ unions, these were ‘false peasant demands’ that 
played into the hands of elements harmful to Soviet power.100 The state was very willing to listen 
to the peasants when they complained about issues such as excessive taxation, according to 
Kamenev, but it is clear that there was a narrow window for negotiation.  
Whereas the kulak threat was not prominent in police reports during the first years of NEP, it rose 
in prominence from 1924 such that by 1927 it had become a principal focus of the monthly political 
obzoryi prepared by the OGPU for party leaders. From 1926 the party moved away from the pro-
‘well-to-do’ policy of previous years by introducing heavier taxation on the stronger peasants, and 
it intensified attempts to organize the poor, especially before elections. Such measures, naturally, 
displeased the more enterprising peasants, who objected to what they saw as economically 
unproductive and discriminatory stoking of class struggle, and a return to the dreaded civil war-
era poor peasants’ committees.101 In the police reports – which may have been increasingly shaped 
by changing political winds as well as shaping those changes102 - such sentiments were explained 
as the expressions of ‘wealthy’ peasants or kulaks, who were organizing with intent to ‘paralyze’ 
the independent organization of poor and middle peasants by preaching ‘class peace.’103 
Elsewhere, ‘kulak’ agitation for the election of only non-party candidates (peasants often 
complained that they were merely asked to approve party appointees at soviet elections) was 
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described as ‘demagogic’ distortion of Soviet policies.104 In addition, when local soviets resisted 
the new taxation policy, they were described in the reports as being composed of ‘alien and 
harmful’ elements.105 Tracy McDonald, while acknowledging the very real social tensions within 
the villages, explains that this type of situation was ‘read [by the party] in class terms, but it could 
just as easily be read as a rational, political village response.’106  
This scenario of intensified class struggle made sense according to the original Bolshevik 
conception of NEP as a period of contradictory and potentially fatal class politics.107 However, 
though the kulaks were much maligned in police and party discourse, there was significant 
confusion within the party about how to identify and define them, with some stressing property 
criteria and others the use of hired labour or implements.108 The category of hired labour was itself 
an ambiguous criterion. In advance of the significant Fifteenth Party Congress in 1927, an expert 
report prepared by the Worker-Peasant Inspection Commissariat suggested that no more than 20% 
of hired labour in the countryside could be considered ‘exploitative’ in a true sense.109 Molotov, 
speaking at the Thirteenth Party Congress in 1924, acknowledged that sometimes a ‘large’ 
proportion of the rural population was wrongly categorized as kulaks.110 Peasants themselves 
seemed to approach the question from a traditional moral economy perspective; they agreed on the 
criterion of exploitative forms of hired labour, but they also identified a kulak ‘soul.’111 It is true 
that Bolsheviks did not invent rural class divisions, and Bolshevik identity-categories were 
sometimes adopted by peasants themselves.112 Yet peasants often did object to those categories 
and their normative assumptions, counter-posing instead their own distinctions between hard-
working households and weaker peasants as ‘idlers.’113  
In 1927, police reports depicted intensified hostility on the part of wealthy peasants and kulaks 
towards Soviet power.114 Whereas in 1925 the party’s Politburo insisted that the middle peasants 
were the predominant social and economic rural stratum,115 by 1927, as NEP began to unravel, the 
OGPU was transmitting a different message. Its reports suggested that up to 80% of excess grain 
(i.e. after tax) was in the hands of the wealthy and the kulaks, and that these elements were 
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deliberately and recklessly engaged in ‘speculation’ by withholding from the market to await more 
favourable terms of trade.116 Despite the marked evolution of police reporting since the start of the 
decade, some reports continued to provide explanations for peasant behaviour that might have 
called into question the direction of policy.117 The often more nuanced local reports sent to the 
OGPU sometimes suggested that the poor peasants were the main withholders of tax.118 Even the 
OGPU’s political obzor for July 1927 suggested that in the Volga and Siberia, the ‘peasantry’ 
(undifferentiated) was unwilling to market grain at current prices, yet willing to seek agreement 
with the state.119 Nonetheless, by 1928 the peasantry as a whole could appear the problem, and the 
success of kulak agitation was reported more frequently. In fact, a lengthy OGPU report of that 
year attributed ‘all cases’ of mass peasant demonstrations during the previous two years to the 
agitation and provocation of ‘anti-soviet elements.’120 The alleged role of kulaks, and the category 
indicated by the new term ‘podkulachnik,’ meaning peasants under the control of kulaks, were 
utilised to explain peasant resistance to the state’s intensified efforts to secure grain following the 
onset of the grain-supply crisis of 1927-28.121 In the course of 1928, the narrative of intentional 
kulak resistance and sharp intensification of class struggle became a central aspect of party 
discourse. One contributor to the Central Committee’s journal for rural communists contended that 
‘if we ignore classes and class struggle in our country, then it is impossible to understand why the 
crisis with grain-supply occurred not in 1926-27, but in 1927-28.’122 
Yet even as party discourse had become firmly focused on the alleged dangers of the kulaks by 
1928, a more complex representation of agency ensured a divergence of opinion on the crucial 
question whether or not kulaks would be allowed to join the rapidly expanding collective farms. 
Moshe Lewin opined that the absence until the last moment of indications of the brutal policy of 
de-kulakization, pursued from 1930, was due to the fact that the party was ‘neither clear nor 
certain’ about ‘the social nature of the kulak.’123 For some communists, the kulak was a ‘sworn, 
irreconcilable enemy of socialist construction’ and should be excluded from the kolkhozy. During 
the first half of 1929, however, the official party line was that kulaks should not in principle be 
excluded from the possibility of adapting to socialist living inside the new farms, once the 
possibility of capitalist exploitation had been removed.124 By the latter months of 1929, with 
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increasing reports of alleged kulak-inspired disorder within kolkhozy, there was greater emphasis 
in party discourse on the ‘class nature of the kulaks’ that rendered them irreconcilable to the Soviet 
order.125 The kulak, as Lynne Viola explains, was ‘denied agency’ by Bolshevik discourse, and 
was ascribed a caste-like social status.126 The party leadership soon achieved consensus on the 
necessity to exclude kulaks from the collective farms, which led to the process of de-kulakization 
in the villages. 
Conclusions 
The evolution of Bolshevik understandings and representations of agency is quite central to an 
understanding of how the party understood the Soviet populace and interpreted deviant behavior. 
This question is particularly fascinating because of the complex and multi-layered approach to 
agency suggested by Marxist-Leninist ideology, which allowed the Soviet regime to explain away 
much popular deviance as the result of ‘darkness’ or ‘little consciousness.’ Such an understanding 
of consciousness even allowed for the possibility of reform of malicious offenders and class 
enemies, thereby distinguishing the purpose of the Soviet camp system from Nazi death camps.127 
In theory at least, Soviet punitive policy was at the forefront of progressive European penology, 
suggesting from the outset that incarceration should be utilized as little as possible, and that the 
purpose of punishment was not punishment as such but to restore the criminal to society. When 
criminal law was codified in 1922, the maximum prison sentence was set at ten years. In its 
eschatological vision, Leninism aimed at the creation of a pure and harmonious future society, but 
in the meantime it generated considerable anxiety about the prospects for realizing this vision, 
especially with the adoption of NEP in 1921. There arose in Soviet penal policy a tension between 
the reformatory impulse and the necessity of ensuring social defense from the ‘contagion’ of 
criminality and deviance, as well as the practical issue of the state’s ability to devote the necessary 
resources to reform. This tension may be understood in terms of the more general relationship 
between intentions and realities in Soviet history. In addition, the dictates of the revolutionary 
time-frame to achieve communism limited the party’s capacity for patience and tolerance.128 By 
the middle of the 1920s, the use of extrajudicial police measures to remove ‘socially-dangerous 
elements’ was common, and would intensify in the course of the following decade.  
There are many factors at work when explaining Bolshevik decision-making. Regarding punitive 
policies, pragmatic concerns of state security were crucially important, but there was a deeper 
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obstacle to the practical embodiment of the progressive, lenient approach to the perpetrator: 
namely, the tension between nature and nurture in Bolshevik thought. Leninism envisaged the 
eventual withering away of class distinctions, but during the socialist transition, it required a 
discriminatory class refraction of social realities. This led, as Graeme Gill puts it, to a ‘sort of 
essentialist approach’ that associated ‘class membership (at times class origin) with particular 
values’ and political orientations.129 If worker or peasant perpetrators were typically understood 
to lack ‘awareness,’ and to require the party’s tutelage to bring them from ‘darkness’ to ‘light,’ 
class enemies were typically assumed to act with conscious intent consistent with their class 
interests. From the latter years of the 1920s especially, the Bolshevik proclivity to resort to 
simplistic class formulae, when faced with a more threatening and unruly situation in the country, 
is apparent.130 The identification of class enemies, though, was not a simple or consistent 
operation, and it often depended on behavior. Lynne Viola explains that ‘Bolshevism had famously 
upended Marx’s dictum that being determines consciousness. In the Soviet context, consciousness, 
or actions and attitudes, determined being, or class.’131  
Finally, this article has touched on the question of subjectivity in the Soviet context, one that has 
generated much scholarly interest and discussion since the mid-1990s.132 Our concern here, 
though, has been with subjectivity as viewed by the regime, not as articulated by Soviet subjects 
themselves. In his assessment of some of the pioneering studies of Soviet subjectivity, Eric Naiman 
concludes that, rather than an empowered individual who has attained self-realization, the ‘ideal 
Stalinist subject’ was in fact highly circumscribed within the norms of Stalinist discourse, not so 
much a ‘New Man’ as an ‘abridged man.’133 This article has demonstrated that the party-state’s 
conception of subjectivity allowed both an empowering assertion of agency, as individuals could 
release themselves from the constraints of their upbringing and habits, and yet a constriction, even 
absence, of real agency according to certain pre-conceived convictions of how people should think 
and behave, and how certain categories of people naturally behaved.  
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